 |
9. The establishment of this minefield will simplify and mitigate all
questions of local defence north of its point of contact with
Cornwall. We must consider this sector from Cornwall to the Mull
of Cantyre as the least vulnerable to sea-borne invasion. Here the
works of defence should be confined to guarding by a few guns
or land torpedo tubes the principal harbours, and giving a
moderate scale of protection to their gorges. 3 It is not admissible
to lavish our limited resources upon this sector.
10. North of the Mull of Cantyre to Scapa Flow, the Shetlands and
the Faroes, all lies in the orbit of the main Fleet. The voyage of
an expedition from the Norwegian coast would be very
hazardous, and its arrival anywhere right round to Cromarty Firth
would not raise immediately decisive issues. The enemy, who is
now crouched, would then be sprawled. His advance would lie in
difficult and sparsely inhabited country. He could be contained
until sufficient forces were brought to bear and his
communications immediately cut from the sea. This would make
his position all the more difficult, as the distances to any
important objective are much longer and he would require
considerable wheeled transport. It would be impossible to fortify
all landing points in this sector, and it would be a waste of energy
to attempt to do so. A much longer period may be allowed for
counter-attack than in the southeast opposite London.
293
11. From Cromarty Firth to the Wash is the second most
important sector, ranking next after the Wash to Dover. Here,
however, all the harbours and inlets are defended, both from the
sea and from the rear, and it should be possible to counter-attack
in superior force within twenty-four hours. The Tyne must be
regarded as the second major objective after London, for here
(and to a lesser extent at the Tees) grievous damage could be
done by an invader or large-scale raider in a short time. On the
other hand, the sea and air conditions are more favourable to us
than to the southward.
12. The Combined Staffs should endeavour to assign to all these
sectors their relative scales of vulnerability and defence, both in
the number of men employed in the local defence of beaches and
of harbours, and also in the number of days or hours within
which heavy counter-attacks should be possible. As an indication
of these relative scales of attack and defenhapter 1 - No Love Under the Wind and Moon
The fog has lightened due to the strong winds, but as time approaches, solitude lies by the stream. A mysterious song is heard from afar, seemingly from the Jiangnan province. A soft and graceful tune was played which carried across the lake?s surface under the cover of the mist. Once the song had finished, a small boat appeared. Within the boat were five girls who were singing and laughing, picking lotuses into the boat. The lyrics the girls sang were from the poem The Butterfly Loves the Flower, written by the Song poet Ouyang Xiu, the words sung matched what the girl was feeling inside; though only sixty words were sung, the season, time of day, place, scenery and the girl?s face, clothes, hair adornments, emotions were all described meticulously. The next part of the song is as if someone is narrating a scene, a love story, which is close at heart yet far away, but a love which isn?t yet exhausted.
Ouyang Xiu was in Jiangnan as a court official where he lived a leisurely lifestyle, doing as he pleased, absorbed in what he was doing (reading, writing etc.,). People of Song shouldn?t use their position to abuse the town?s people, but it is not forbidden to use poetry for leisure. As long as a line of poetry came out, as long as there is well water to accompany a song, as the Jiangnan spring comes and the willow buds, as lotuses are on the autumn lake, everything that follows is an Ou poem.
It was during the year when Southern Song was established, and when the South Lake became popular. It was near mid autumn, as lotus leaves began to decay, and when lotus pods were at their best. A song spread across the lake to a Taoist priestess?s ear. As she sat alone underneath a willow tree quietly, the night winds forced her to place an apricot yellow robe on. The winds managed to brush a piece of dirt on her neck. She hid her feelings, as ?a lonely heart like a string struggling to be untangled?. The song gradually moves away, the song is a verse of Ouyang Xiu?s Butterfly Loves a Flower. A light breeze carried two sentences; ?there are no lovers meeting under the wind and moon, the past is like a dream cut short?. The song comes to a rest. A smile came upon her lips.
She let out a sigh and raised a left hand revealing a bloody palm. ?What do you find so funny?? she mumbled to herself. She sang to herself, without understanding the regret and sorrow within the poem.
Standing about one hundred feet away from the p and especially to the one that on September 1 you
had over a thousand unserviceable trainer aircraft? I have long
suspected that the inefficiency which formerly ruled in the A.S.U.s
and left us with only forty-five airplanes when the new
Government was formed, as against about one thousand two
hundred now, was reproduced in all the trainer establishments
and communication flights and that a great mass of airplanes
were kept in an unserviceable state, and I remember particularly
the statement of one of your high officers that the Training
Command worked on a basis of fifty per cent unserviceable. Who
is responsible for repair and training establishments? If I were
you, I should throw the whole business of repair on to M.A.P.,
and then you would be able to criticise them for any
(Action this day.)
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air. 14.XII.40.
718
shortcomings.
See also the figures of how repaired aircraft and engines have
increased since the change was made.
I recur to the point I made to you yesterday when you sent me
your letter to M.A.P. The Air Ministry?s view is that the Germans
have nearly 6000 airplanes in front-line action, and we have
about 2000. Air Ministry also believe that the German output is
1800 a month, out of which they provide only 400 for training
establishments, while we, out of 1400 output, provide also 400.
How do you, then, explain that the Germans are able to keep
three times our establishment in front-line action with only an
equal monthly subscription of trainer aircraft? Apparently, on your
figures, which I may say I do not accept (except for controversial
purposes), the Germans can keep three times as large a force in
action as you can for the same number of trainer planes. I know
that you will rightly say you are preparing for the expansion of
the future, but they have to keep going on a threefold scale, and
expand as well.
I await with keen interest further developments of your
controversy.
It is a magnificent achievement 23 in the teeth of the bombing.
Quite apart from new production, the repaired aircraft has been
your own creation. We now have 1200 in the A.S.U.?s, which is a
great comfort. Dispersion has greatly hampered you, but was
absolutely necessary as an insurance to spread the risk.
In addition, you have not confined yourself to mere numbers,
but, on the contrary, have pushed hard into quality.
The reason why there is this crabbing, as at A,24 is of course the
w though progressing
rapidly towards the production stage, will not be available in sufficient
quantities, even if all goes well, for many months to come. We have not
been able so far to give the additional armour protection to our larger ships.
The political situation in the Baltic is as baffling as ever. On the other hand,
the arrival of the Bismarck in September adds greatly to the scale of the
surface resistance to be encountered.
2. But the war may well be raging in 1941, and no one can tell what
opportunities may present themselves then. I wish, therefore, that all the
preparations of various ships and auxiliaries outlined in your table and
marked as ?beneficial? should continue as opportunity offers; that when
ships come into the dockyards for repair or refit, everything should be done
to them which will not delay their return to service. And it would surely be
only common prudence, in view of the attitude of Russia, to go on warning
our destroyers for service in winter seas. I am glad to feel that we are
agreed in this.
* * * * *
Mr. Churchill to First Sea Lord. 15.I.40.
415
So far no ally had espoused our cause. The United States was cooler than in any other
period. I persevered in my correspondence with the President, but with little response. The
Chancellor of the Exchequer groaned about our dwindling dollar resources. We had already
signed a pact of mutual assistance with Turkey, and were considering what aid we could
give her from our narrow margins. The stresses created by the Finnish War had worsened
our relations, already bad, with the Soviets. Any action we might undertake to help the
Finns might lead to war with Russia. The fundamental antagonisms between the Soviet
Government and Nazi Germany did not prevent the Kremlin actively aiding by supplies and
facilities the development of Hitler's power. Communists in France and any that existed in
Britain denounced the ?imperialist-capitalist? war, and did what they could to hamper work
in the munition factories. They certainly exercised a depressing and subversive influence
within the French Army, already wearied by inaction. We continued to court Italy by
civilities and favourable contracts, but we could feel no security, or progress towards
friendship. Count Ciano was polite to our Ambassador. Mussolini stood aloof.
The Italian Dictator was not, however, without his own misgivings. On January 3, he wrote
a revealing letter to Hitler expressing his distaste fthat the shore batteries could be
either destroyed or dominated to such an extent as to permit
transports to enter? If so, how many ships and what type would you
propose?
On this Admiral Forbes asked for details about the Trondheim defences. He agreed that the
shore batteries might be destroyed or dominated in daylight by battleships provided with
suitable ammunition. None was carried at that moment in Home Fleet ships. The first and
most important task, he said, was to protect troopships from heavy air attack over the
thirty miles approach through narrow waters, and the next to carry out an opposed landing
of which ample warning had been given. In the circumstances he did not consider the
operation feasible.
The Naval Staff persisted in their view, and the Admiralty with my earnest agreement
replied on April 15 as follows:
We still think that the operation described should be further studied.
It could not take place for seven days, which would be devoted to
careful preparation. Danger from air not appreciably less wherever
these large troopships are brought into the danger zone. Our idea
would be that in addition to R.A.F. bombing of Stavanger
467
aerodrome, Suffolk should bombard with high-explosive at dawn,
hoping thereby to put the aerodrome out of business. The
aerodrome at Trondheim could be dealt with by Fleet air -arm
bombers and subsequently by bombardment. High-explosive shells
for fifteen-inch guns have been ordered to Rosyth. Furious and First
Cruiser Squadron would be required for this operation. Pray,
therefore, consider this important project further.
Admiral Forbes, although not fully convinced of its soundness, therefore addressed himself
to the project in a more favourable mood. In a further reply he said that he did not
anticipate great difficulty from the naval side, except that he could not provide air defence
for the transports while carrying out the landing. The naval force required would be the
Valiant and Renown to give air defence to the Glorious, the Warspite to bombard, at least
four A.A. cruisers and about twenty destroyers.
* * * * *
While plans for the frontal attack on Trondheim from the sea were being advanced with all
speed, two subsidiary landings were already in progress designed to envelop the town from
the landward side. Of these the first was a hundred miles to the north, at Namsos, where
Major-General Carton de Wiart, V.C., had been chosen to command the troops with orders
?to secindications. I had
imagined something almost imperceptible, certainly vague and doubtful. I
never imagined that I should hear one of those creatures asking to be
destroyed. It is a marvellous system and achievement.
The Asdics did not conquer the U-boat; but without the Asdics the U-boat would not have
been conquered.
128
A Second Heavy Stroke ? Adowa Memories ? A Time of Caution ? A Talk at the Foreign
Office ? The Peace Ballot ? British Naval Strength in the Mediterranean ? Sir Samuel
Hoare's Speech at Geneva and British Naval Movements ? My Speech to the City Carlton
Club ? Mussolini Invades Abyssinia ? Strong Reaction in Britain; Mr. Lansbury Resigns
the Leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party ? Sham Sanctions ? Mr. Baldwin
Resolved on Peace ? The Conservative Party Conference ? Mr. Baldwin's Conduct of the
Election ? His Great Majority ? The Hoare-Laval Agreement ? The Parliamentary
Convulsion ? I Stay Abroad ? The Effect upon Europe of Mussolini's Conquest of
Abyssinia.
W ORLD PEACE now suffered its second heavy stroke. The loss by Britain of air parity was
followed by the transference of Italy to the German side. The two events combined enabled
Hitler to advance along his predetermined deadly course. We have seen how helpful
Mussolini had been in the protection of Austrian independence, with all that it implied in
Central and Southeastern Europe. Now he was to march over to the opposite camp. Nazi
Germany was no longer to be alone. One of the principal Allies of the First World War
would soon join her. The gravity of this downward turn in the balance of safety oppressed
my mind.
Mussolini's designs upon Abyssinia were unsuited to the ethics of the twentieth century.
They belonged to those dark ages when white men felt themselves entitled to conquer
yellow, brown, black, or red men, and subjugate them by their superior strength and
weapons. In our enlightened days, when crimes and cruelties have been committed from
which savages of former times would have recoiled, or of which they would at least have
been incapable, such conduct was at once obsolete and reprehensible. Moreover, Abyssinia
was a member of the League of Nations. By a curious inversion it was Italy who had in
1923 pressed for her inclusion, and Britain who had opposed it. The British view was that
the character of the Ethiopian Government and the conditions prevailing in that wild land of
tyranny, slavery, and tribal war were not consonant with was violent and brave, the second son Cha He Tai [Chagataifrom Malta will hamper the
sending of further reinforcements ? Italian or German ? from
Europe into Africa.
18. All this might be put effectively in train by October 1,
provided we are allowed the time. If not, we must do what we
can. All trained or Regular units, whether fully equipped or not,
must be used in defence of the Delta. All armed white men and
also Indian or foreign units must be used for internal security.
The Egyptian Army must be made to play its part in support of
the Delta front, thus leaving only riotous crowds to be dealt with
in Egypt proper.
Pray let the above be implemented and be ready to discuss it in
detail with me at 4.30 P.M., August 16.
With this General Wavell returned to Cairo in the third week of August.
* * * * *
I now have to record a small but at the time vexatious military episode. The
Italians, using vastly superior forces, drove us out of Somaliland. This story
requires to be told.
Until December, 1939, our policy in a war with Italy was to evacuate
Somaliland; but in that month General Ironside, C.I.G.S., declared for defence
of the territory, and in the last resort to hold Berbera. Defences were to be
prepared to defend the Tug Argen Gap through the hills. One British battalion
(the Black Watch), two Indian, and two East African battalions, with the
Somaliland Camel Corps and one African light battery, with small detachments
of anti-tank and anti-aircraft units, were gathered by the beginning of August.
General Wavell on July 21 telegraphed to the War Office that cartier ladies santos series replica watches withdrawal
without fighting would be disastrous for our influence, and that Somaliland
might be a valuable base for further offensive action. Fighting began during
his visit to London, and he told the Middle East Ministerial Committee that,
although the strategic disadvantages of the loss of Somaliland would be slight,
it would be a blow to our prestige.
The Italians entered British Somaliland on August 3 with three battalions of
423
Italian infantry, fourteen of colonial infantry, two groups of pack artillery, and
detachments of medium tanks, light tanks, and armoured cars. These large
forces advanced upon us on August 10, and a new British commander,
General Godwin Austen, arrived on the night of the 11th. In his instructions he
had been told, ?Your task is to prevent any Italian advance beyond the main
position? . You will take the necessary steps for withdrawal if necessary.?
Fighting took place on the 12th and 13th,beaches.
In July I created a separate Combined Operations Command under the Chiefs
of Staff for the study and exercise of this form of warfare, and Admiral of the
Fleet Sir Roger Keyes became its chief. His close personal contact with me and
with the Defence Office served to overcome any departmental difficulties
arising from this unusual appointment.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
5.VIII.40
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
9.VIII.40.
248
I have appointed Admiral of the Fleet Sir Roger Keyes as Director
of Combined Operations. He should take over the duties and
resources now assigned to General Bourne. General Bourne
should be informed that, owing to the larger scope now to be
given to these operations, it is essential to have an officer of
higher rank in charge, and that the change in no way reflects
upon him or those associated with him. Evidently he will have to
co-operate effectively. I formed a high opinion of this officer?s
work as Adjutant-General Royal Marines, and in any case the
Royal Marines must play a leading part in this organisation.
Pending any further arrangements, Sir Roger Keyes will form
contact with the Service Departments through General Ismay as
representing the Minister, of Defence.
* * * * *
I have already explained how smoothly the office of Minister of Defence came
into being and grew in authority. At the end of August, I took the only formal
step which I ever found necessary. Hitherto the Joint Planning Committee had
worked under the Chiefs of Staff and looked to them as their immediate and
official superiors. I felt it necessary to have this important, though up till now
not very effective, body under my personal control. Therefore, I asked the
War Cabinet to give approval to this definite change in our war machine. This
was readily accorded me by all my colleagues, and I gave the following
instructions:
The Joint Planning Committee will from Monday next work
directly under the orders of the Minister of Defence and will
Prime Minister to General Ismay and Sir Edward Bridges. 17.VII.40
Prime Minister to General Ismay and Sir Edward Bridges. 24.VIII.40.
249
become a part of the Minister of Defence?s office ? formerly the
C.I.D. Secretariat. Accommodation will be found for them at
Richmond Terrace. They will retain their present positions in and
contacts with the three Service Departments. They will work out
the details of such plans as are communicated to them by the
Minister of Defenfactories, but if our air
defence is so strong that enemy can only come on dark nights
precision will not be easy. I therefore feel solid confidence in
British ability to continue the war, defend the island and the
Empire, and maintain the blockade.
I do not know whether it will be possible to keep France in the
war or not. I hope they will, even at the worst, maintain a
gigantic guerrilla. We are reconstituting the B.E.F. out of other
units.
We must be careful not to let Americans view too complacently
Prime Minister to Mr. Mackenzie King.
5.VI.40.
148
prospect of a British collapse, out of which they would get the
British Fleet and the guardianship of the British Empire, minus
Great Britain. If United States were in the war and England
[werethe new convoy, together
with estimated dates for their being mounted.
3. Relations with Vichy. We cannot accept the position that we
495
must yield to the wishes of Vichy out of fear lest they make air
raids upon Gibraltar, for there would be no end to that. We must
reassert our blockade of the Straits, dealing with vessels whether
escorted or unescorted, though without violating Spanish
territorial waters. We should assemble a sufficient force at
Gibraltar for this purpose at the earliest date possible. Meanwhile,
we must maintain as good a blockade of Dakar as possible, and
protect Duala, etc., from a counter-stroke by the French cruisers
in Dakar. The conversations with Vichy, if they take place, may
reach a modus vivendi falling somewhat short of these
desiderata. Of course, if we could be assured that Vichy, or part
of Vichy, was genuinely moving in our direction, we could ease
up on them to a very large extent. It seems probable that they
will be increasingly inclined to move as we desire, and I
personally do not believe that hard pressure from us will prevent
this favourable movement. It is becoming more difficult every day
for Vichy to lead France into war with us. We must not be too
much afraid of checking this process, because the tide in our
favour will master and overwhelm the disturbing eddies of the
blockade and possible sea incidents. I do not believe that any
trouble will arise with the French which will prevent the
impending movement of our convoy to Malta. The chance is
there, but it is remote and must be faced.
4. The greatest prize open to Bomber Command is the disabling
of Bismarck and Tirpitz. If Bismarck could be set back for three or
four months, the King George V could go to the Eastern
Mediterranean to work up, and could therefore play a decisive
part in the occupation of Malta by the Fleet. This would speedily
transform the strategic situation in the Mediterranean.
5. Should October pass without invasion, we should begin the
reinforcement of the Middle East by the Cape route to the utmost
extent our shipping permits, sending, as arranged, the armoured
units, the Australians and New Zealanders, in November, another
British division before Christmas, and at least four more during
January, February, and March. All this would be in addition to the
necessary drafts. Let me know how far your present programme
of sailings conforms to this.
496
6. The time has also come for a further strong reinfrom her pockets, two ?ting? noises were heard as they collided with each other, she said, ?Little brother, if you follow my instructions then I?ll give these ingots to you.?
Yang Guo originally didn?t want to have anything do with her, but he heard that her words were suspicious and wanted to find out what she wanted so he pretended to be stupid, and looked at the ingots and said, ?What use do those shiny rocks have??
The Taoist priestess smiled and said, ?It?s money. If you want new clothes, chickens, rice, you could buy them with this.?
Yang Guo put on a baffled expression and said, ?You want to lie to me, I don?t believe you.?
The Taoist priestess laughed and said, ?When have I lied to you? Hey, little kid, what is your name??
Yang Guo said, ?Everyone calls me ?Sha Dan? (Dumb Egg), don?t you know that? What?s your name??
The Taoist priestess laughed and said, ?Sha Dan, you can call me Angelic Priestess, where?s your mother??
Yang Guo said, ?My mum just scolded me, and went over to the other side of the mountain to chop firewood.?
The Taoist priestess said, ?I need a hatchet, go to your home and get one, and then lend it to me.?
Yang Guo was curious, he opened his eyes wide, drooled and made himself look even more like a stupid person, he shook his head incessantly and said, ?I can?t; I can?t lend my family?s hatchet. If dad finds out I?ll be punished.?
The Taoist priestess smiled and said, ?When your parents see the money, they?ll be too pleased to punish you.? As she said this she passed an ingot in his direction. Yang Guo extended his hand to catch it, and then pretended to miss it, and let the ingot hit his shoulder and when it came down it hit his right foot, he held his right foot with his hands and hopped on his left foot and called out, ?Ah, ah, you hit me! I?m going to tell mother!? He called and shouted; he ignored the ingot and ran forward.
The Taoist priestess thought that he was interesting, and smiled. She took off her belt, and waved it at his right foot. Yang Guo heard the wind sound and turned his head around, he was alarmed, and thought, ?That?s our Ancient Tomb sect?s kung fu! Isn?t she a disciple of Quanzhen?? He didn?t dodge and let her belt wrap around his right leg, he fell on the ground and relaxed his body, letting her pull him towards her, and secretly feared, ?Is she going up the mountain to attack Gu Gu??
He thought about Xiao Longnu, he didn?t know whether she was dead or alive, he was extremely worrithat the French idea is
that, provided the Belgians are still holding out on the Meuse, the
French and British Armies should occupy the line Givet-Namur, the
British Expeditionary Force operating on the left. We consider it
would be unsound to adopt this plan unless plans are concerted with
the Belgians for the occupation of this line in sufficient time before
the Germans advance. Unless the present Belgian attitude alters and
plans can be prepared for early occupation of the Givet-Namur [also
called Meuse-Antwerp though eminently desirable, is not essential to
the seizure and retention of the iron-fields. While therefore every
preparation to send the Fleet in should continue, and strong efforts
should be made, it would be wrong to try it unless we can see our
way to maintaining it under air attack, and still more wrong to make
the seizure of the iron -fields dependent upon the sending of a
surface fleet. Let us advance with confidence and see how the naval
side develops as events unfold.
And again a week later:
I have carefully considered all the papers you have been good enough to
send me in reply to my various minutes about ?Catherine.? I have come
reluctantly but quite definitely to the conclusion that the operation we
outlined in the autumn will not be practicable this year. We have not yet
obtained sufficient mastery over U-boats, mines, and raiders to enable us to
fit for their special duties the many smaller vessels required. The problem of
making our ships comparatively secure against air attack has not been
solved. The dive-bomber remains a formidable menace. The rockets [called
for secrecy ?the U.P. weapon,? i.e., unrotated projectile If you keep on talking this rubbish, saying I?m your wife and what not, just watch me cut your head off.? She raised her saber as she said this.
Yang Guo held his head and jumped to the side and pleaded, ?Miss, I won?t say it anymore.?
The girl said, ?Look at you, even an ugly old hag wouldn?t marry you.? Yang Guo laughed foolishly and didn?t reply.
Now, the sky was dark, the two stood in the unkempt land; they turned around, and saw smoke from cooking rising up from the town and both felt hungry.
The young girl said, ?Sha Dan, go to the market and buy ten buns.?
Yang Guo shook his head and said, ?I won?t go.? The young girl?s face turned angry and she said, ?Why not?? Yang Guo said, ?I won?t go! You are tricking me to go buy some buns so you could sneak off.? The young girl said, ?I said I won?t slip away so I won?t.? Yang Guo shook his head. The girl curled up her fist wanting to hit him but he quickly jumped to the side. The two of them ran around the bull like they were playing hide and seek. The girl was lame and it wasn?t easy for her to move. She saw the boy tripping up in front of her crying and shouting out, yet, although she possessed lightness kung fu, she was still unable to catch up with him.
The girl was furious, she thought about her martial arts, yet for some reason, she had allowed an ugly and smelly country bumpkin Sha Dan to stay on her tail. She had no way to escape, it might be said that she was incompetent. Yang Guo had made himself so much like the character he was supposed to be that when the girl failed three or four times to kill the Sha Dan, she was not suspicious. She followed the main road south and she saw that Yang Guo was holding onto the bull and catching up. She thought that she must find a way to kill him unexpectedly. In the short time it takes to cook rice, the sky had become even darker. She saw an old and run down stone house; it looked abandoned and thought, ?Tonight I?ll sleep here and when that idiot is sleeping in the middle of the night, I?ll kill him with one slash.? She walked towards the house and entered, dust entered her nose, the chairs and tables were broken and it appeared that this house was deserted long ago. She cut some grass and wiped a long table clean; she lay on the table, closed her eyes and rested. She saw that Yang Guo hadn?t followed her, and called out, ?Sha Dan! Sha Dan!? She didn?t hear a reply and thought, ?Could it be that the fool knows that I was going to kill him and left!raids on
Lyons and Marseilles, that we should be able to strike back with
our heavy bombers at Italy the moment she enters the war. I
consider therefore that these squadrons should be flown to their
aerodromes in Southern France at the earliest moment when
French permission can be obtained and when the servicing units
are ready for their reception.
Pray let me know at our meeting tonight what you propose.
It is of the highest importance that we should strike at Italy the
moment war breaks out, or an overbearing ultimatum is received.
Please let me know the exact position of the servicing units which
are on their way to the southern aerodromes in France.
An early Italian plan, favoured particularly by Ciano, had been that Italian
action in Europe should be confined to the launching of an attack on
Yugoslavia, thus consolidating Italy?s power in Eastern Europe and
strengthening her potential economic position. Mussolini himself was for a
time won over to this idea. Graziani records that at the end of April the Duce
told him, ?We must bring Yugoslavia to her knees; we have need of raw
materials and it is in her mines that we must find them. In consequence my
strategic directive is ? defensive in the west (France) and offensive in the east
(Yugoslavia). Prepare a study of the problem.? 3 Graziani claims that he
advised strongly against committing the Italian armies, short as they were of
equipment, particularly of artillery, to a repetition of the Isonzo campaign of
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for Air and Chief of Air Staff. 2.VI.40.
Prime Minister to S. of S. for Air and C.A.S.
6.VI.40.
131
1915. There were also political arguments against the Yugoslav plan. The
Germans were anxious at this moment to avoid disturbing Eastern Europe.
They feared it would provoke British action in the Balkans and might
inadvertently tempt Russia to further activity in the East. I was not aware of
this aspect of Italian policy.
I have hitherto argued against going to war with Italy because
she attacked [i.e., if she were to attackcause me great anxiety. I had understood that Randle
[factoryof the Staff, three Ministers,
and General Ismay, who all have a voice in Norwegian operations (apart
from Narvik). But no one is responsible for the creation and direction of
military policy except yourself. If you feel able to bear this burden, you may
count upon my unswerving loyalty as First Lord of the Admiralty. If you do
not feel you can bear it, with all your other duties, you will have to delegate
your powers to a deputy who can concert and direct the general movement
of our war action, and who will enjoy your support and that of the War
Cabinet unless very good reason is shown to the contrary.
Before I could send it off, I received a message from the Prime Minister saying that he had
been considering the position of Scandinavia and felt it to be unsatisfactory. He asked me
to call on him that evening at Downing Street after dinner to discuss the whole situation in
private.
I have no record of what passed at our conversation, which was of a cartier santos white most friendly
character. I am sure I put the points in my unsent letter, and that the Prime Minister
agreed with their force and justice. He had every wish to give me the powers of direction
for which I asked, and there was no kind of personal difficulty between us. He had,
however, to consult and persuade a number of important personages, and it was not till
May 1 that he was able to issue the following note to the Cabinet and those concerned.
May 1, 1940.
I have been examining, in consultation with the Ministers in charge of the
service departments, the existing arrangements for the consideration and
decision of defence questions, and I circulate for the information of my
colleagues a memorandum describing certain modifications which it has
been decided to make in these arrangements forthwith. The modifications
have been agreed to by the three Service Ministers. With the approval of the
First Lord of the Admiralty, Major-General H. L. Ismay, C.B., D.S.O., has
been appointed to the post of Senior Staff Officer in charge of the Central
Staff which, as indicated in the memorandum, is to be placed at the disposal
of the First Lord. Major -General Ismay has been nominated, while serving in
483
this capacity, an additional member of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. N. C.
Defence Organisation
In order to obtain a greater concentration of the direction of the war, the
following modifications of present arrangements will take effect.
The First Lord of the Admiralty will continue to tak4 have been a great disappointment
so far this war. The question of their alternative uses ought to be
considered by the Admiralty. I expect they have a large number
of skilled ratings on board. Could I have a list of these ships, their
tonnage, speeds, etc. Could they not carry troops or stores while
plying on their routes?
* * * * *
My indignation at the denial of the Southern Irish ports mounted under these
pressures.
* * * * *
Prime Minister to Minister of Transport.
27.XII.40.
Prime Minister to First Lord.
29.XII.40.
Prime Minister to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.
1.XII.40.
599
The straits to which we are being reduced by Irish action compel
a reconsideration of these subsidies [to Ireland
had been fully recognised by England and France. I told him I should
support such an idea if it were agreeable. The British public would be willing
to try all roads to an honourable peace. I think there should be a meeting of
three. Any agreement they reached would of course be submitted to the
League of Nations. It seems to me the only chance of avoiding the
destruction of Italy as a powerful and friendly factor in Europe. Even if it
failed, no harm would have been done, and at present we are heading for
an absolute smash.
506
MY NOTE ON THE FLEET AIR ARM
WRITTEN FOR SIR THOMAS INSKIP, MINISTER FOR THE CO-ORDINATION
OF DEFENCE, IN 1936
1. It is impossible to resist an admiral's claim that he must have complete control of, and
confidence in, the aircraft of the battle fleet, whether used for reconnaissance, gun-fire or
air attack on a hostile fleet. These are his very eyes. Therefore the Admiralty view must
prevail in all that is required to secure this result.
2. The argument that similar conditions obtain in respect of Army co-operation aircraft
cannot be countenanced. In one case the aircraft take flight from aerodromes and operate
under precisely similar conditions to those of normal independent air force action. Flight
from warships and action in connection with naval operations is a totally different matter.
One is truly an affair of cooperation only; the other an integral part of modern naval
operations.
3. A division must therefore be made between the air force controlled by the Admiralty and
that controlled by the Air Ministry. This division does not depend upon the type of the
undercarriage of the aircraft, nor necessarily the base from which it is flown. It depends
upon the function. Is it predominantly a naval function or not?
4. Most of these defence functions can clearly be assigned. For instance, all functions which
require aircraft of any description (whether with wheels, floats, or boats; whether
reconnaissance, spotters or fighters, bombers or torpedo seaplanes) to be carried regularly
in warships or in aircraft carriers, naturally fall to the naval sphere.
5. The question thus reduces itself to the assignment of any type operating over the sea
from shore bases. This again can only be decided in relation to the functions and
responsibilities placed upon the Navy. Aircraft borne afloat could discharge a considerable
function of trade protection. This would be especially true in the broad waters, where a
the whole vast business of our worldwide trade
continues without interruption or appreciable diminution. Great convoys of
troops are escorted to their various destinations. The enemy's ships and
commerce have been swept from the seas. Over 2,000,000 tons of German
shipping is now sheltering in German, or interned in neutral harbours. In the
first fortnight of the war we have actually arrested, seized, and converted to
our own use, 67,000 tons more German merchandise than has been sunk in
ships of our own. Again I reiterate my caution against oversanguine
conclusions. We have in fact, however, got more supplies in this country this
afternoon than we should have had if no war had been declared and no Uboat
had come into action. It is not going beyond the limits of prudent
statement if I say that at that rate it will take a long time to starve us out.
From time to time the German U-boat commanders have tried their best to
behave with humanity. We have seen them give good warning and also
endeavour to help the crews to find their ways to port. One German captain
signalled to me personally the position of a British ship which he had just
328
sunk, and urged that rescue should be sent. He signed his message,
?German Submarine.? I was in some doubt at the time to what address I
should direct a reply. However, he is now in our hands, and is treated with
all consideration.
Even taking six or seven U-boats sunk as a safe figure, 7 that is one-tenth of
the total enemy submarine fleet as it existed at the declaration of war
destroyed during the first fortnight of the war, and it is probably one-quarter
or perhaps even one-third of all the U -boats which are being employed
actively. But the British attack upon the U-boats is only just beginning. Our
hunting force is getting stronger every day. By the end of October, we
expect to have three times the hunting force which was operating at the
beginning of the war.
This speech, which lasted only twenty-five minutes, was extremely well received by the
House, and in fact it recorded the failure of the first German U-boat attack upon our trade.
My fears were for the future, but our preparations for 1941 were now proceeding with all
possible speed and on the largest scale which our resources would allow.
* * * * *
By the end of September, we had little cause for dissatisfaction with the results of the first
impact of the war at sea. I could feel that I had effectively taken over the great d
This represented the highest professional advice, and of course is just the kind of thing that
passes easily through a grave, wise Cabinet. Events swept it away; but not until a great
deal of money had been spent. The barrage mines came in handy later on for other tasks.
* * * * *
Presently a new and formidable danger threatened our life. During September and October,
nearly a dozen merchant ships were sunk at the entrance of our harbours, although these
had been properly swept for mines. The Admiralty at once suspected that a magnetic mine
378
had been used. This was no novelty to us; we had even begun to use it on a small scale at
the end of the previous war. In 1936, an Admiralty Committee had studied counter -
measures against magnetic-firing devices, but their work had dealt chiefly with countering
magnetic torpedoes or buoyant mines, and the terrible damage that could be done by large
ground-mines laid in considerable depth by ships or aircraft had not been fully realised.
Without a specimen of the mine, it was impossible to devise the remedy. Losses by mines,
largely Allied and neutral, in September and October had amounted to fifty-six thousand
tons, and in November Hitler was encouraged to hint darkly at his new ?secret weapon? to
which there was no counter. One night when I was at Chartwell, Admiral Pound came down
to see me in serious anxiety. Six ships had been sunk in the approaches to the Thames.
Every day hundreds of ships went in and out of British harbours, and our survival depended
on their movement. Hitler's experts may well have told him that this form of attack would
compass our ruin. Luckily he began on a small scale, and with limited stocks and
manufacturing capacity.
Fortune also favoured us more directly. On November 22 between 9 and 10 P.M., a German
aircraft was observed to drop a large object attached to a parachute into the sea near
Shoeburyness. The coast here is girdled with great areas of mud which uncover with the
tide, and it was immediately obvious that whatever the object was it could be examined
and possibly recovered at low water. Here was our golden opportunity. Before midnight
that same night two highly skilled officers, Lieutenant-Commanders Ouvry and Lewis from
H.M.S. Vernon, the naval establishment responsible for developing underwater weapons,
were called to the Admiralty, where the First Sea Lord and I interviewed them and heard
their plans. By 1.30 in the morning, they were on tis not to be
waited for in the case of the Weser operation; overcast, foggy weather is
more satisfactory for the latter. The general state of preparedness of the
naval forces and ships is at present good.
* * * * *
From the beginning of the year, the Soviets had brought their main power to bear on the
Finns. They redoubled their efforts to pierce the Mannerheim Line before the melting of the
snows. Alas, this year the spring and its thaw, on which the hard-pressed Finns based their
hopes, came nearly six weeks late. The great Soviet offensive on the Isthmus, which was
to last forty-two days, opened on February 1, combined with heavy air -bombing of base
depots and railway junctions behind the lines. Ten days of heavy bombardment from Soviet
guns, massed wheel to wheel, heralded the main infantry attack. After a fortnight's
fighting, the line was breached. The air attacks on the key fort and base of Viipuri
increased in intensity. By the end of the month, the Mannerheim defence system had been
disorganised, and the Russians were able to concentrate against the Gulf of Viipuri. The
Finns were short of ammunition and their troops exhausted.
The honourable correctitude which had deprived us of any strategic initiative equally
hampered all effective measures for sending munitions to Finland. We had been able so far
only to send from our own scanty store contributions insignificant to the Finns. In France,
however, a warmer and deeper sentiment prevailed, and this was strongly fostered by M.
Daladier. On March 2, without consulting the British Government, he agreed to send fifty
thousand volunteers and a hundred bombers to Finland. We could certainly not act on this
scale, and in view of the documents found on the German major in Belgium, and of the
ceaseless Intelligence reports of the steady massing of German troops on the Western
432
Front, it went far beyond what prudence would allow. However, it was agreed to send fifty
British bombers. On March 12, the Cabinet again decided to revise the plans for military
landings at Narvik and Trondheim, to be followed at Stavanger and Bergen, as a part of the
extended help to Finland into which we had been drawn by the French. These plans were
to be available for action on March 20, although the need of Norwegian and Swedish
permission had not been met. Meanwhile, on March 7, Mr. Paasikivi had gone again to
Moscow; this time to discuss armistice terms. On the twelfth, the Russian terms weto debate
the general issues of policy, programmes, and all else connected with the air
services.
My invitation was not intended as a muzzle, but as a gesture of friendliness
to an old colleague.
Accordingly, for the next four years I attended these meetings and thus obtained a full view
117
of this vital sphere of our air defence, and built up my ideas upon it year by year in close
and constant discussion with Lindemann. I immediately prepared a memorandum for the
Committee which embodied the thought and knowledge I had already gathered, without
official information, in my talks and studies with Lindemann and from my own military
conceptions. This paper is of interest because of the light which it throws on the position in
July, 1935. No one at that time had considered the use of radio beams for guiding
bombers. The difficulties of training large numbers of individual pilots were obvious, and it
was generally held that at night large fleets of aircraft would be led by a few masterbombers.
Great advances into new fields were made in the four years which were to pass
before the life of the nation was to be at stake; and meanwhile the adoption of bombing
guided by radio beams caused profound tactical changes. Hence much that was written
then was superseded, but a good deal was tried by me when I had power? not all with
success.
23 July, 1935.
The following notes are submitted with much diffidence, and in haste on
account of our early meeting, in the hopes that they may be a contribution
to our combined thought.
General tactical conceptions and what is technically feasible act and react
upon one another. Thus, the scientist should be told what facilities the air
force would like to have, and airplane design be made to fit into and
implement a definite scheme of warfare.
At this stage we must assume a reasonable war hypothesis, namely, that
Great Britain, France, and Belgium are allies attacked by Germany.
After the outbreak of such a war, the dominating event will be the
mobilisation of the great Continental armies. This will take at least a
fortnight, diversified and hampered by mechanised and motorised inroads.
The French and German General Staffs' minds will be riveted upon the
assembly and deployment of the armies. Neither could afford to be markedly
behindhand at the first main shock. It may be hoped that Germany will not
be ready for a war, in which the Army and Navy are to play an important
part, for two or three y and tanks
employed in even larger numbers than are here suggested,
especially the quick-moving tank and lighter varieties, would
operate in an area where no preparations could have been made
to receive them. These may be thought new and important
favourable considerations.
* * * * *
In this paper also I had an alternative plan for making an artificial island in the
shallow waters of Horn Reef (to the northward):
Paragraph 30. One of the methods suggested for investigation is
as follows: A number of flat-bottomed barges or caissons, made
not of steel, but of concrete, should be prepared in the Humber,
at Harwich, and in the Wash, the Medway, and the Thames.
These structures would be adapted to the depths in which they
were to be sunk, according to a general plan. They would float
when empty of water, and thus could be towed across to the site
of the artificial island. On arrival at the buoys marking the island,
sea-cocks would be opened, and they would settle down on the
bottom. They could subsequently be gradually filled with sand, as
opportunity served, by suction dredgers. These structures would
range in size from 50? X 40? X 20? to 120? X 80? X 40?. By this
means a torpedo- and weather-proof harbour, like an atoll, would
be created in the open sea, with regular pens for the destroyers
and submarines, and alighting platforms for aeroplanes.
This project, if feasible, is capable of great elaboration, and it
might be applied in various places. Concrete vessels can perhaps
be made to carry a complete heavy-gun turret, and these, on the
admission of water to their outer chambers, would sit on the sea
floor, like the Solent forts, at the desired points. Other sinkable
structures could be made to contain storerooms, oil tanks, or
living gucci watch uk chambers. It is not possible, without an expert inquiry, to
244
do more here than indicate the possibilities, which embrace
nothing less than the creation, transportation in pieces,
assemblement, and posing of an artificial island and destroyer
base.
31. Such a scheme, if found mechanically sound, avoids the need
of employing troops and all the risks of storming a fortified island.
It could be applied as a surprise, for although the construction of
these concrete vessels would probably be known in Germany, the
natural conclusion would be that they were intended for an
attempt to block up the river mouths, which indeed is an idea not
to be excluded. Thus, until the island or system of bWe know President is our best friend, but it is
no use trying to dance attendance upon Republican and
Democratic Conventions. What really matters is whether Hitler is
master of Britain in three months or not. I think not. But this is a
matter which cannot be argued beforehand. Your mood should
be bland and phlegmatic. No one is downhearted here.
* * * * *
In the closing days at Bordeaux, Admiral Darlan became very important. My
contacts with him had been few and formal. I respected him for the work he
had done in re-creating the French Navy, which after ten years of his
professional control was more efficient than at any time since the French
Revolution. When in November, 1939, he had visited England, we gave him an
official dinner at the Admiralty. In response to the toast, he began by
reminding us that his great-grandfather had been killed at the Battle of
Trafalgar. I therefore thought of him as one of those good Frenchmen who
hate England. Our Anglo-French naval discussions in January had also shown
how very jealous the Admiral was of his professional position in relation to
whoever was the political Minister of Marine. This had become a positive
obsession, and I believe played a definite part in his action.
228
For the rest, Darlan had been present at most of the conferences which I have
described, and as the end of the French resistance approached, he had
repeatedly assured me that whatever happened the French Fleet should never
fall into German hands. Now at Bordeaux came the fateful moment in the
career of this ambitious, self-seeking, and capable Admiral. His authority over
the Fleet was for all practical purposes absolute. He had only to order the
ships to British, American, or French colonial harbours ? some had already
started ? to be obeyed. In the morning of June 17, after the fall of M.
Reynaud?s Cabinet, he declared to General Georges that he was resolved to
give the order. The next day Georges met him in the afternoon and asked him
what had happened. Darlan replied that he had changed his mind. When
asked why, he answered simply, ?I am now Minister of Marine.? This did not
mean that he had changed his mind in order to become Minister of Marine,
but that being Minister of Marine he had a different point of view.
How vain are human calculations of self-interest! Rarely has there been a
more convincing example. Admiral Darlan had but to sail in any one of his
ships to any port outside France to become the mas the middle of April, the Soviet Government entered
into negotiations with the British and French Governments about the
necessary measures to be taken. The negotiations started then are not yet
concluded. It became clear some time ago that if there was any real desire
to create an efficient front of peaceable countries against the advance of
aggression, the following minimum conditions were imperative:
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of an
effective pact of mutual assistance against aggression, of an exclusively
defensive character.
A guarantee on the part of Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of the
states of Central and Eastern Europe, including without exception all the
European countries bordering on the U.S.S.R., against an attack by
aggressors.
The conclusion between Great Britain, France, and the U.S.S.R. of a definite
agreement on the forms and extent of the immediate and effective
assistance to be rendered to one another and to the guaranteed states in
the event of an attack by aggressors.
The negotiations had come to a seemingly unbreakable deadlock. The Polish and Rumanian
Governments, while accepting the British guarantee, were not prepared to accept a similar
undertaking in the same form from the Russian Government. A similar attitude prevailed in
another vital strategic quarter? the Baltic States. The Soviet Government made it clear that
they would only adhere to a pact of mutual assistance if Finland and the Baltic States were
included in a general guarantee. All four countries now refused, and perhaps in their terror
would for a long time have refused, such a condition. Finland and Esthonia even asserted
that they would consider a guarantee extended to them without their assent as an act of
aggression. On the same day, May 31, Esthonia and Latvia signed non-aggression pacts
with Germany. Thus Hitler penetrated with ease into the frail defences of the tardy,
irresolute coalition against him.
288
The Threat to Danzig ? General Gamelin Invites Me to Visit the Rhine Front ? A Tour with
General Georges ? Some Impressions ? French Acceptance of the Defensive ? The
Position of Atomic Research ? My Note on Air Defence ? Renewed Efforts to Agree with
Soviet Russia ? Polish Obstruction ? The Military Conversations in Moscow ? Stalin's
Account to Me in 1942 ? A Record in Deceit ? Ribbentrop Invited to Moscow ? The
Russo-German Non-Aggression Treaty ? The News Breaks upon the Worlwas
to get Russia out of Europe, to gain time, and to complete the German
armaments.? 7
* * * * *
Hitler's judgment had been once more decisively vindicated. The German General Staff was
utterly abashed. Once again the Fuehrer had been right, after all. He with his genius and
intuition alone had truly measured all the circumstances, military and political. Once again,
as in the Rhineland, the Fuehrer's leadership had triumphed over the obstruction of the
German military chiefs. All these generals were patriotic men. They longed to see the
Fatherland regain its position in the world. They were devoting themselves night and day to
every process that could strengthen the German forces. They, therefore, felt smitten in
their hearts at having been found so much below the level of the event, and in many cases
their dislike and their distrust of Hitler were overpowered by admiration for his
commanding gifts and miraculous luck. Surely here was a star to follow, surely here was a
guide to obey. Thus did Hitler finally become the undisputed master of Germany, and the
path was clear for the great design. The conspirators lay low, and were not betrayed by
their military comrades.
* * * * *
It may be well here to set down some principles of morals and action which may be a guide
in the future. No case of this kind can be judged apart from its circumstances. The facts
may be unknown at the time, and estimates of them must be largely guesswork, coloured
by the general feelings and aims of whoever is trying to pronounce. Those who are prone
by temperament and character to seek sharp and clear-cut solutions of difficult and obscure
problems, who are ready to fight whenever some challenge comes from a foreign Power,
have not always been right. On the other hand, those whose inclination is to bow their
heads, to seek patiently and faithfully for peaceful compromise, are not always wrong. On
the contrary, in the majority of instances they may be right, not only morally but from a
practical standpoint. How many wars have been averted by patience and persisting good
will! Religion and virtue alike lend their sanctions to meekness and humility, not only
between men but between nations. How many wars have been precipitated by firebrands!
How many misunderstandings which led to wars could have been removed by temporising!
How often have countries fought cruel wars and then after a few years of peace found
themselves not only friends but allies!
3 When I
mentioned fifty-seven thousand the other day in the Cabinet, I
was assured that they represented a very small part of what were
actually employed, and that one hundred thousand was nearer
the mark, and that many more were coming in before the end of
the week. Now, instead, we have a figure of only forty thousand.
Pray let me have a full explanation of this.
It is very wrong that fighting troops should be kept from their
training because of the neglect to employ civilian labour.
The question must be brought up at the Cabinet on Monday.
Let me see a list of prominent persons you have arrested.
If we could have large supplies of multiple projectors and rockets
directed by Radar irrespective of cloud or darkness, and also
could have the proximity fuze working effectively by day and to a
lesser extent in moonlight or starlight, the defence against air
attack would become decisive. This combination is therefore the
supreme immediate aim. We are not far from it in every respect,
yet it seems to baffle us. Assemble your ideas and facts so that I
may give extreme priority and impulse to this business.
It seems to me that the blockade is largely ruined, in which case
Prime Minister to General Ismay. (Secret.)
28.VI.40.
Prime Minister to Home Secretary.
28.VI.40.
Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.
29.VI.40.
Prime Minister to Professor Lindemann.
29.VI.40.
638
the sole decisive weapon in our hands would be overwhelming air
attack upon Germany.
We should gain great relief in the immediate future from not
having to maintain an army in France or sending supplies of beef,
coal, etc., to France. Let me know about this.
How has the question of beef supplies been affected? We are
freed from the obligation to supply the French Army with beef.
There is really no reason why our Army at home should have
rations far exceeding the heavy munitions workers?. The
complications about frozen meat and fresh meat ought also to be
affected by what has happened, although I am not sure which
way.
JULY
If it be true that a few hundred German troops have been landed
on Jersey or Guernsey by troop-carriers, plans should be studied
to land secretly by night on the islands and kill or capture the
invaders. This is exactly one of the exploits for which the
Commandos would be suited. There ought to be no difficulty in
getting all the necessary information from the inhabitants and
from those evacuated. The only possible rein forcements wh The only scale of attack which it seems to me
need be contemplated for the centre of Government is, say, five
hundred parachutists or Fifth Columnists. What is the present
plan, and what is the scale against which it is being provided?
You might do something for Jos. He is a grand-hearted man.
I am rather doubtful, from information which has reached me,
whether our home timber resources are being adequately
developed.
This, of course, is primarily a matter for the Minister of Supply,
who I know has made certain departmental adjustments recently
with this particular end in view.
Let me have a statement showing the scheme of defence for the
Central Government, Whitehall, etc. What was the scale of attack
prescribed, and who was responsible for taking the measures?
What was the reason for attempting to put an anti-tank obstacle
across St. James?s Park? Who-ordered this? When was it counterordered?
Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War.
20.VII.40.
Prime Minister to Minister without Portfolio.
20.VII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
21.VII.40.
Prime Minister to General Ismay.
23.VII.40.
647
I am told that the refuelling of fighter aeroplanes could be much
more rapidly achieved if there were more tankers on the
aerodromes, and considering that an attack by air would make
every minute gained in returning the fighters to the air most
precious, I should be glad if measures were taken at once to
double it or greatly increase the fuelling facilities.
I do not seem to have had any answer from you to my query
about whether the 2d Canadian Division and all it stands for is
being frittered away in Iceland.
1. It is, of course, urgent and indispensable that every effort
should be made to obtain secretly the best possible information
about the German forces in the various countries overrun, and to
establish intimate contacts with local people, and to plant agents.
This, I hope, is being done on the largest scale, as opportunity
serves, by the new organisation under M.E.W. None of this
partakes of the nature of military operations.
2. It would be most unwise to disturb the coasts of any of these
countries by the kind of silly fiascos which were perpetrated at
Boulogne and Guernsey. The idea of working all these coasts up
against us by pin-prick raids and fulsome communiques is one to
be strictly avoided.
3. Sir Roger Keyes is now studying the whole subject of medium
raids ? i.e., not less than five nor more than ten In addition to the above, at
least three batteries of British artillery, although horse -drawn,
must be embarked immediately from India for Suez. Admiralty to
arrange transport.
10. Most of the above movements should be completed between
September 15 and October 1, and on this basis the Army of the
Delta should comprise:
(1) The British Armoured Force in Egypt.
(2) The four British battalions at Mersa Matruh, the two at
Alexandria, and the two in Cairo ? total, eight.
(3) The three battalions from the Canal Zone.
(4) The reserve British Brigade from Palestine ? total, fourteen
British Regular infantry battalions.
(5) The New Zealand Brigade.
(6) The Australian Brigade from Palestine.
(7) The Polish Brigade.
(8) Part of the Union Brigade from East Africa.
(9) The Fourth Indian Division now in rear of Mersa Matruh.
(10) The new Indian division in transit.
(11) The eleven thousand men in drafts arriving almost at once at
Suez.
(12) All the artillery (one hundred and fifty guns) now in the
Middle East or en route from India.
(13) The Egyptian Army so far as it can be used for field
operations.
420
11. The above should constitute by October 1, at the latest thirtynine
battalions, together with the armoured forces; a total of
56,000 men and 212 guns. This is exclusive of internal security
troops.
(Part II)
12. It is hoped that the armoured brigade from England of three
regiments of tanks will be passed through the Mediterranean by
the Admiralty. If this is impossible, their arrival round the Cape
may be counted upon during the first fortnight in October. The
arrival of this force in September must be deemed so important
as to justify a considerable degree of risk in its transportation.
(Part III) Tactical employment of the above force:
13. The Mersa Matruh position must be fortified completely and
with the utmost speed. The sector held by the three Egyptian
battalions must be taken over by three British battalions, making
the force homogeneous. This must be done even if the Egyptian
Government wish to withdraw the artillery now in the hands of
these three battalions. The possibility of reinforcing by sea the
Mersa Matruh position and cutting enemy communications, once
they have passed by on their march to the Delta, must be studied
with the Naval Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean Fleet.
Alternatively a descent up
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